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NOTES
Students, Beware: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District
I. INTRODUCTION
As the number of sexual harassment claims in the workplace continues to
increase, awareness of harassment in an educational setting has parallely risen.'
Both primary and secondary students are filing more complaints than ever before.
2
Nearly every circuit has addressed the issue of sexual harassment in schools, and
various tests ranging from actual knowledge to strict liability have developed to
determine the liability of a school district The United States Supreme Court
resolved this conflict in the circuits in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District.4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that actual knowledge and deliberate
indifference were required to impose liability on a school district for sexual
harassment of a student by an employee.5
This paper analyzes the Gebser decision. It presents a brief history of the
relevant discrimination laws, especially Title IX, the statute prohibiting
discrimination in federally funded educational programs.6 It describes the different
theories of liability that the appellate courts have developed. It analyzes the
Supreme Court decision, its rationale, and its policy implications. Finally, this
paper proposes an alternative standard of agency liability.
II. THE GEBSER CASE
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Alida Star Gebser, a student in the Lago Vista Independent
School District of Texas, brought suit against the district and a teacher for
violations of Title IX and state negligence law.! While thirteen years old and in the
eighth grade, the plaintiff was placed in a high school book discussion class led by
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Catherine Maraist, Note, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: An Analysis of the Subjective
Perception Test Required by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 57 La. L. Rev. 1343 (1997).
2. Alexandra Bodnar, Note, Arming Students for Battle: Amending Title IX to Combat the
Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Primary and Secondary Schools, 5 S. Cal. Rev. L &
Women's Stud. 549, 558 (1996).
3. See Kracunas v. lona College,! 19 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija,
101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
4. 118 S. Ct. 1989(1998).
5. Id. at 1998.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(Supp 1999).
7. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
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Frank Waldrop, a Lago Vista high school teacher.' During the course of these
discussions, Waldrop made sexually suggestive remarks to students.9 In the fall of
1991, the plaintiff entered the Lago Vista High School, and Waldrop taught her
both semesters, continuing to make inappropriate remarks that became increasingly
directed toward the plaintiff."0 The relationship between the plaintiff and Waldrop
soon became sexual in the spring of 1992. " Rebuffing questions from teachers, the
plaintiff did not report the incident, and she and Waldrop had sexual intercourse
repeatedly, during secret off-campus sexual encounters. 2 During the summer, the
plaintiff was a student in Waldrop's Advanced Placement class, and she had
regular sexual relations with him. 3
The plaintiff did not report the relationship although she realized it was
improper.'4 She was unsure about to whom to complain, and she still desired to
have Waldrop as a teacher and to participate in his advanced classes. " At this time,
the school district had not distributed an official grievance procedure for filing
sexual harassment complaints, nor had it issued an anti-harassment policy.' 6 There
was no appointed person to receive harassment claims, and there was no attempt
to educate the faculty or students about sexual harassment." Instead, during a
portion of the time period of the relationship, the district only had in effect two
written policies, one that prohibited employees from sexual harassment of students,
and one that prohibited employees from any sexual harassment of a student or
employee."
In October of 1992, on the basis of two other students' complaints about
inappropriate remarks made by Waldrop in class, a meeting was arranged with the
parents, principal, and Waldrop, at which Waldrop apologized and was warned
about his conduct. 9 The principal did not investigate the matter any further, nor
8. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866).
9. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
10. Id. For example, Waldrop once referred to"Tantra," believing that Gebser would understand
it to be "sex magic." Brief for Petitioner at 3, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989
(1998) (No. 96-1866).
11. Under the pretense of delivering a book to the plaintiff, who was home alone, Waldrop
complimented plaintiffon her maturity, embraced her, kissed her, and fondled her breasts and genitalia.
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
12. Brief for Respondent at 4, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., I 18 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866); Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
13. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., I 18 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
.96-1866).
14. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
98-1866).
16. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866).
18. Brief for Respondent at 5, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., I 18 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866).
19. Gebser, 118S. Ct. at 1993.
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did he report the incident to the superintendent.20 However, in January of 1993, a
police officer discovered the plaintiff and Waldrop having sexual intercourse'.
2
Waldrop was fired, and his teaching license was revoked. 2
The plaintiff and her mother originally filed suit in state court against Waldrop
for violation of state tort law, then amended the suit to join Lago Vista for
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972.' The case was removed to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas, which granted summaryjudgment for Lago Vista
and remanded the claims against Waldrop to state court.' The district court
reasoned that before liability can be imposed upon them, the school administrators
must have some kind of notice, and they must fail to respond in good faith.'
The plaintiff appealed the Title IX claim to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the district court's decision.26 In a brief opinion, the Fifth Circuit
rejected strict liability for school districts in Title IX sexual harassment cases.27
Next, the court rejected a constructive notice standard because there was not
enough evidence to indicate that a school official knew or should have known
about the abuse." Finally, the court rejected an agency theory, whereby the
employer is vicariously liable for the tort of an employee accompanied by the
"existence of the agency relationship." 9 The Fifth Circuit held that a school
district is not liable unless an official with supervisory power actually knew of the
abuse and failed to end it.30
The Supreme Court affirmed.3' Acknowledging that a school district may be
liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student,32 the Court held that in order
for a plaintiff to recover under Title IX, "an official who at a minimum had
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures
on the recipient's behalf" must have actual knowledge of discrimination and must
be deliberately indifferent.3" The Court's analysis focused primarily on the text of
Title IX, comparing it with Title VII, which prohibits discrimination and sexual
harassment (among other things) in an employment setting, and with Title VI,
which prohibits racial discrimination. Noting that the private right of action under
20. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866).
21. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at1993.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. 1999)).
24. Gebser, I 18 S. Ct. at 1993.
25. Id.
26. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997).
27. Id. at 1225.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1226. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
31. Gebser, I 18 S. Ct at 1993.
32. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
33. Gebser, I1SS. Ct. at 1999.
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Title IX is judicially implied, the Court sought to shape the remedy to conform with
the purpose of the statute. The Court discovered a two-fold purpose: "to avoid the
use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and "to provide
individual citizens effective protection against those practices." '34 In order to fulfill
this two-fold purpose, the Court mandated that the recipient of federal funding have
actual notice of the discrimination through the awareness of an official with
authority to correct it.35
B. Relevant Law
The Supreme Court in Gebser undertook a textual analysis and comparison of
Title IX with Titles VI and VII. All three statutes concern forms of
discrimination: Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex, Title VI prohibits
discrimination based on race, and Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex
or race in employment." All three must be understood in order to understand the
rationale and critiques of Gebser.
1. Sexual Harassment in an Employment Context: Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for the employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or natural origin."3 This Title provides
employees a right to be free from unlawful discrimination by their employers.39
Originally, claims were lodged as class actions, but they gradually transformed into
tort remedies. 4' As a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs with a Title
VII claim may now recover up to $300,000 for discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.41
Title VII provides a cause of action for sexual harassment.42 Defined as
unwelcome sexual conduct, sexual harassment may occur in two forms: "quid pro
quo" and "hostile environment." 3 "Quid pro quo" discrimination involves
34. Id. at 1997 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,704.99 S. Ct. 1946, 1961
(1979)).
35. Gebser, 118 S.'Ct. at 1996-98; U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
36. See generally Gebser, 118 S. Ct. 1989.
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1984); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
39. Kaya Clark, Note, School Liability and Compensations for Title IX Sexual Harassment
Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 Ceo. Wash. L. Rev. 353, 360 (1998).
40. Maraist, supra note I, at 1357-58.
41. Clark, supra note 39, at 360.
42. E.E.O.C. 1980 Guidelines; 29 CFR § 1604.11 (a) (1985).
43. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986). See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985) (defining sexual harassment-as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances; (b)
[r]equests for sexual favors; (c) [o]ther verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature").
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advances or requests for sexual favors in return for advancements or other
employment decisions, and "hostile environment" involves an environment that
interferes with performnce." Both types of claims are readily actionable under
Title VII.4
s
Hostile work environment claims, however, have developed more slowly.
The theory was first recognized in the context of race discrimination. ' As
claims developed for sexual harassment under Title IX, Henson v. City of
Dundee" defined the five elements of a hostile environment claim: (1) the
employee is part of a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to
sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment
was so pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment; and (5) there is a basis for the employer's
liability. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson," the first Supreme Court
ruling on a sexual harassment claim, the Court held that a hostile
environment was actionable under Title VII. Later, in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.," the Court established an objective/subjective test for an
abusive work environment. Finally, in Faragher City of Boca Raton ' and
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,5' the Court has recently held employers
vicariously liable for sexual harassment by employees, subject to an
affirmative defense. In those two decisions, the Court specifically relied on
agency principles, reasoning that "most workplace tortfeasors are aided in
accomplishing their tortious objectives by the existence of an agency
relationship." 2  However, this theory of liability was limited by the
affirmative defense: (1) if the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
harassment, and (2) the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the preventive
opportunities."
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 I(a)(i) and (aX2) (1985) define sexual harassment as occurring when
"submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment" or "submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decision affecting such individual" (equivalent to quid pro quo). 29 C.AR. §
1604.11 (aX3) defines sexual harassment as conduct which "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment" (hostile environment).
45. See Barbara Zalucki, Comment, Discrimination Law-Defining the Hostile Work
Environment Claim of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 11 W. New Eng. L Rev. 143, 147-48
(1989).
46. See Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957,92 S. Ct.
2058 (1972).
47. 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir. 1982).
48. 477 U.S. 57, 73, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2408 (1986).
49. 510U.S.17,21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370(1993).
50. 524 U.S. 775, 11 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
51. 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
52. Id. at 753, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
53. Id. at 754, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
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2. Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs: Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits any person, "on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, [to] be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."' It was enacted to terminate federal
funding to entities that engaged in racial discrimination." Since then, a variety of
claims have been brought under the auspices of Title VI. For example, in Regents
v. Bakke, 6 a white male challenged a medical school's admission program as
discriminatory because it assured admission of a certain number of minority
students.
Although Title VI does not provide a private cause of action, courts have
nevertheless implied one. In Lau v. Nichols," the Supreme Court gave the
plaintiffs, students challenging a school district's language program, relief under
Title VI. The availability of a private cause of action was affirmed in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York," which also
limited the right to apply to only intentional discrimination.
3. Sexual Harassment in Education: Title IX
Title IX provides that no "person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. . . ."" Recipients of federal funds must comply with rules and regulations
issued to accomplish the objectives of Title IX. Compliance with the requirements
may be attained by the termination of funds or assistance (after an opportunity for
a hearing and an express finding of a failure to comply) or by any other authorized
means.' Finally, the statute provides that no action may be taken until an
appropriate person has been advised of the failure and still refuses to comply
voluntarily.6
Two seminal cases established the procedural requirements for Title IX sexual
harassment actions.62 In Cannon v. University of Chicago," the Supreme Court
held that, although Title IX did not contain an express, private cause of action for
damages, nevertheless it provided an implied private cause of action. Title IX
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1984).
55. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,284,98 S. Ct. 2733,2745 (1978)1
56. Id. at 269-70, 98 S. Ct. at 2737.
57. 414 U.S. 563, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974).
58. 463 U.S. 582,603, 103 S. Ct. 3221,3223 (1983).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (Supp. 1999).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998).
61. Id.
62. In Title IX cases, as in Title VII cases, sexual harassment is interpreted as prohibited
discrimination. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
63. 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
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confers a benefit on a particular class discriminated against because of sex."
Because of its similarity to Title VI, which also has an implied right of action, the
Court reasoned Title IX was to have the same right.6 Also, it seemed more
sensible to give a claimant individual relief rather than placing the burden of proof
of termination of federal funding on them." In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 7 the Supreme Court went beyond Cannon to explicitly hold that Title IX
provides a damages remedy. Expanding the Cannon decision, the Court decided
that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies of Title IX."
4. Legislative History of Title IX
The legislative history of Title IX is often cited as support for theories
concerning the Title's legislative predecessor, i.e., whether it was modeled after
Title VI or Title VII. In Cannon, the Court stated that Title IX was enacted "to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and "to
provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices."69
At the time it enacted Title IX, Congress had already enacted Title VI and Title
VII, which were intended to halt racial and gender discrimination; however, gender
discrimination still remained in educational programs. 70 In June and July of 1970,
Representative Edith Green chaired the House Subcommittee on Education and
Labor, which held hearings on gender discrimination in federally funded education
systems. 7' In those hearings, debates focused on equality in education." Senator
Green argued that women should have more access to higher education, but there
was no discussion about discrimination in the form of sexual harassment.73 The
subcommittee considered proposing an amendment that would have added the word
"sex" to the list of discriminations in Title VI and applied the nondiscrimination
requirements of Title VII. One court described this amendment as a way to
"bridge the gap" between Title VII and Title VI," but the House never passed the
resolution.76
64. Id. at 694-96, 99 S. Ct. at 1956-57.
65. Id. at 699-700,99 S. Ct. at 1958-59.
66. Id. at 705, 99 S.Ct. at 1962.
67. 503 U.S. 60, 76, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038 (1992);
68. Id. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
69. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704, 99 S. Ct. at 1961.
70. Paul C. Sweeney, Abuse, Misuse, and Abrogation of the Use of Legislative History: Title IX
and Peer Sexual Harassment, 66 UMKC L Rev. 41 (1997).
71. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390,1395(11th Cir. 1997), rev'don other
grounds, 526 U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
72. Sweeney, supra note 70, at 66.
73. Id. at66nn.129& 130.
74. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95 n.16, 99 S. Ct. at 1956-57 n.16.
75. Davisv.MonroeCounty, 120 F.3d 1390,1396(1 IthCir. 1997),rev'don othergrounds, 526
U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
76. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695 n.16, 99 S. Ct. at 1957 n.16.
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The present Title IX was passed by joint contributions of the House and
Senate. In 1971, the House introduced a new bill prohibiting gender discrimination
in any federally funded educational program." Meanwhile, the Senate had passed
an education bill, which was intended to improve access to higher education by
low-income students and increase the quality of teaching,"8 but did not include an
anti-discrimination amendment . 9  The House adopted an anti-discrimination
amendment to the Senate bill, but the Senate committee to which the bill was
referred restored it to its original form." However, the Senate did finally accept
an antidiscrimination provision, which its sponsor said would close a loophole in
existing legislation.8 As in the House, debates in the Senate focused on
discrimination against women in educational programs, in other words, admission
procedures, scholarship, and employment, but not sexual harassment.8" Finally, ajoint bill was formed by the Senate Conference Committee, which passed and
became Title IX.3 The House Report states that Title VII excludes educational
institutions and that Title IX brings those in education under the equal employment
protection."
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE IX
Prior to the decision in Gebser, courts were divided as to which standard of
liability should be used in Title IX claims."s The only guidance the Supreme Court
provided was that Title IX should be given "a sweep as broad as its language."'"
Four different standards of school district liability arose in the circuits: (1) actual
knowledge; (2) constructive knowledge; (3) agency principles; and (4) strict
liability.8 '
A. Actual Knowledge
The most defendant friendly, the actual knowledge standard is synonymous
with intentional discrimination, a knowing failure to act on allegations of
77. Sweeney, supra note 70, at 63.
78. Id. at 57.
79. Davisv. Monroe County, 120 F.3d 1390,1396(11 thCir. 1997). rev'don othergrounds, 526
U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999). Senator Bayh introduced the amendment to provide women with
access to and employment in higher education. Sweeney, supra note 70, at 57-58.
80. Sweeney, supra note 70, at 67.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 61.
83. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1397.
84. Doe v. Claiborne County Tennessee, 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996).
85. Trudy Bredthauer, Tweny-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made Progress?, 31
Creighton L Rev. 1107,1119, (1998).
86. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,521, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1918 (1982) (quoting
U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,801,86 S. Ct. 1152 (1966)).
87. Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 97 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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discrimination."8 The person with actual knowledge must be in some position of
authority and must fail to respond adequately.
The Fifth Circuit has developed this theory quite thoroughly,"6 rejecting strict
liability and agency theories in favor of actual knowledge." The court determined
that Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of the Constitution, and
as such,*required clear and unambiguous conditions attached to the funding, which
precludes strict liability.' The recipient of federal funds must be on notice of
potential liability."
The Fifth Circuit has found several bases for its theory. First, the text of Title
IX has the "identical language" of Title VI, which has been interpreted as Spending
Clause legislation." Unlike Title VII, which specifically refers to agents, Title EX
only refers to recipients." Furthermore, a school district cannot "spread the loss"
of enormous verdicts so the children in the district would ultimately pay the price.'
Lastly, requiring actual knowledge results in swifter action as the district can
immediately react and better protect the harassed individual and any other potential
victim. 91
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the question of who should be the
appropriate party to have actual knowledge,' devising a spectrum of potential
candidates. 9 At one end, most friendly to defendants, were members of the school
board. This interpretation would impose practically no liability on districts since
it would be highly unlikely that such a person would have actual knowledge. At
the other end, most friendly to plaintiffs, were any school employees (other than
the perpetrator), which would defeat the entire analysis of the Spending Clause of
no strict liability."ro The court instead chose a middle ground, requiring an official
vested With the power of supervision and remedial action to have actual knowledge
of the harassment.' 0'
88. Vickie J. Brady, Note, Borrowing Standards to Fit the Ttle-Do They Really Fit? Title VII
Standards Applied in Title IX Educational Sexual Harassment Claims as the Conflict Among the
Courts Continues, Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 22 S. Ill. U. L. 411, 420 (1998).
89. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
90. The Fifth Circuit's thoroughness may explain why the United States Supreme Court granted
writs to a Fifth Circuit case. Compare the similarity in arguments in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998), and Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
91. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398-400.
92. Id. at 398-99.
93. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1997).
94. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398.
95. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654.
96. Canutlllo, 101 F.3d at 399.
97. Id. at 399-400.
98. In Canutillo, the court declined to address the question, only providing that the person must
have some authority over the employee. Interestingly, the court mused that person may have to be a
member of the school board. 101 F.3d at 401.
99. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 659.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 660.
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The Seventh Circuit found the Fifth Circuit's logic persuasive, and also held
that a school district is liable only if an official with authority has actual knowledge
and fails to end the harassment. 2 This circuit found a Title VII comparison to be
useful in determining the severity of the harassment, but not useful in determining
the standard of liability.'03 It agreed with the Fifth Circuit that Title IX lacked any
statutory basis for agency principles."°
B. Constructive Knowledge
The constructive knowledge standard would require that a school district
"knew or should have known" of the harassment and failed to take proper action. "s
This theory of liability derives fromMeritor, in which the Supreme Court held that
employers are not always strictly liable for harassment by employees under Title
VII; however, the Court specifically declined to define a rule on employer
liability.'" When addressing Title IX claims under this standard, some
courts have applied Title VII rationale and interpreted Meritor to mean a
constructive knowledge standard should be applied in hostile environment
situations. '°?
Both the First and Eighth Circuits have employed this standard. For example,
in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 08 the First Circuit relied heavily on the
Meritor decision. Citing Meritor, the court held that an educational institution is
liable for a hostile environment if an official "knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known" of the harassment unless the official can
show preventative steps were taken.'0" The Eighth Circuit used the same reasoning
in Kinman v. Omaha Public School District, " holding that Title VII standards
apply to Title IX claims of sexual harassment. Also, relying on Meritor, the court
stated that constructive knowledge and reasonable attempts to alleviate the
harassment were the appropriate standards."'
102. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1024. See also Oona By Kate S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a school is liable for a failure to address a known hostile environment) and Floyd v. Waiters, 133
F.3d 786 (11 th Cir. 1998) (holding that a grant recipient must have actual notice of sexual harassment
and fail to act).
105. Brady, supra note 88, at 425.
106. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2408 (1986).
107. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (I st Cir. 1988) and Kinman v. Omaha
Pub. Sch. Dist.. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
108. 864 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1988).
109. Id. at 901. Note, Lipsett addressed a claim by an employee of an educational institution;
however, presumably the rationale would apply to students.
110. 94 F.3d 463,469(8th Cir. 1996).
Ill. Id. at 468.
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C. Agency
The agency theory finds its roots in the Restatement of Agency."' An agent
acts on behalf of a principal and with the principal's consent." 3 He or she may act
with authority granted by the principal."' Additionaly, he or she may act with
apparent authority, which arises from a third party's perception of the agent-
principal relationship." In the context of Title IX, a school district would be liable
for the actions of a teacher, even if outside of the scope of employment, if the
school discriminated intentionally, negligently, or recklessly or if the teacher was
aided in performing a tort by virtue of his or her agency relationship with the
school.
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the agency responsible for enforcing Title
IX, stated that a school's liability for sexual harassment by its employees should
be determined by agency principles. "6 OCR chose to apply what it interpreted as
the Supreme Court's determination that agency principles govern Title VII and
Title IX claims."" For "quid pro quo" harassment, a school in effect will always
be liable, whether or not it had constructive or actual knowledge, because the "quid
pro quo" harasser always uses authority that has been granted by the school."' For
hostile environment claims, a school will be liable if the employee acted with
apparent authority or was aided in harassing by the employee's position of
authority.'19 OCR defined authority as dependent on factors such as actual
authority and the age of the student. 0
To explain this theory of vicarious liability, courts cite the Restatement of
Agency.'' In Kracunas v. lona College, 2 the Second Circuit relied on agency
112. See generally Restatement Second of Agency (1958) [hereinafter Restatement].
113. Restatement § 1(1) states, "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to
his control, and consent by the other so to act."
114. Restatement § 7 states, "Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the
principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him."
115. Restatement § 8 states,. "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another
person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in
accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons."
116. Brady, supra note 88, at 439.
117. Office for Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039 (1997).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Younger students have a greater tendency to view more people as authority figures.
121. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). Cited by the
Lago Vista court, Section 219 of the Restatement Second of Agency states: "(1) A master is subject
to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment. (2)
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless: (a) the master intended the consequences, or (b) the master was negligent or
reckless, or (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or (d) the servant purported to
act or speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."
122. 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
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principles to reverse summary judgment on the defendant's liability. The court
found that the teacher acted as the school's agent and had authority over the
students, the abuse of which was sufficient to impute liability to the school.'
There was no reason, the court believed, that students should receive less
protection than employees." 4 The Second Circuit also developed a second test:
If an employee does not rely on authority, the school is liable if it provided "no
reasonable avenue for complaint" or if it had constructive knowledge of the
harassment and failed to act.' 2
In Doe v. Claiborne County Tennessee,26 the Sixth Circuit also
concluded that Title VII agency principles apply to Title IX claims. The
court cited two main reasons for applying the standard.' First, the House
Report on Title IX stated that Title IX removes the exception that Title VII
contains for educational institutions.' Secondly, OCR stated that Title VII
agency principles should apply in sexual harassment claims.' 9 Despite the
emphasis on Title VII and agency principles, the court nevertheless
formulated its final inquiry in a somewhat different form: whether the school
took appropriate action after knowing of the harassment, a standard that
undermines the pure agency theory that the court initially embraced. 30
D. Strict Liability
Although never formally adopted by a court as a basis for liability, the
theory of strict liability is liability without fault.' This theory also derives
from Title VII cases, especially Meritor, which stated that "quid pro quo"
actions by employees are imputed to supervisors regardless of fault or
knowledge.' In relying on that reasoning, courts have determined that
under Title VII, quid pro quo harassment makes the employer strictly
liable.13
The Seventh Circuit classified the agency theory as a strict liability
theory. 134  Using the Restatement for determining liability creates strict
liability because in every case of harassment, the argument could be made
that the teacher's status enabled accomplishing the tort. 3 The liability is
123. Id. at 87-88.
124. Id. at 88.
125. Id.





131. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir.
1997).
132. 477 U.S. at 70, 106 S. Ct. at 2407.
133. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1996).
134. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1014.
135. See supra note 79; id. at 1030.
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strict because the district is liable even if it had no knowledge and even if
it acted reasonably. 136 The Seventh Circuit then rejected this standard as
inconsistent with the Spending Clause interpretation of Title IX. 3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Gebser Standard
The standard set out in Gebser involves two requirements: (1) an official with
authority to address and correct the problem must have actual knowledge of the
harassment and (2) the official must fail to respond adequately. 3 The official, in
essence, serves as a representative of the school district. Additionally, the Court
describes the inadequate response as "deliberate indifference" because there must
be an official decision not to correct the violation."' The Court then finds that the
plaintiffs cause of action failed because no official had actual knowledge; the
principal had only complaints from other parents about inappropriate comments. 4 '
Although the Supreme Court chooses the strictest standard for imposing
liability on schools, ambiguities still abound. The Fifth Circuit has previously
addressed the first problem: the status of the official who must have such
knowledge. I' The Supreme Court succinctly defines the appropriate official as
one with the authority to take corrective action; however, the defimition may not
be so clear. The Fifth Circuit debated the status of the official, whether it should
be a school board member or another employee, and finally concluded the official
must have the duty to supervise and the power to end the abuse. 43 The Supreme
Court noticeably omits a reference to supervision, perhaps to dispel totally the
association with agency principles. However, the court leaves many questions as
to what constitutes "authority." Could a tenured teacher be considered an official
with authority over a nontenured one? For example, if a teacher observes
inappropriate gestures, conversations, or touching between a student and a teaching
assistant, would the teacher be in a position of authority? If the teacher is not such
an official, does that teacher have a duty to report the incident to someone with the
proper authority? How should teacher aids, student teachers, and volunteers be
treated? Certainly, a teacher would have authority over aids and volunteers, but not
if a fellow teacher is the harasser. This standard may produce inconsistent results
in some circumstances, and may not even impose liability in a situation where some
official has actual knowledge but not the specific official designated by the
Supreme Court.
136. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1030.
137. Id. at 1029.
138. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 11:8 S. Ct. 1989,1999 (1998).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1997).
142. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1989.
143. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660.
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Furthermore, the Court surmises the status of the official from the enforcement
provision of Title IX.' "Because the express remedial scheme under Title IX is
predicated upon notice to an 'appropriate person' and an opportunity to rectify any
violation,. . .we conclude, in the absence of further direction from Congress, that
the implied damages remedy should be fashioned along the same lines."' 4 This
inference seems logical as it draws on cues from Congress; however, the
enforcement provision specifically addresses only the termination of funding, not
a private right of action. Therefore, the enforcement provision need not control
determining the status of the official for purposes of a private cause of action.
Beyond the textual problems, the actual notice standard also produces policy
concerns. As Justice Stevens writes in his dissent, school districts will have an
incentive to "insulate themselves from knowledge." ' The most extreme example
he cites is one in which every teacher at a school knows of harassment, but no one
has the power to address it.'47 School districts, in an effort to avoid liability, can
refuse to grant power to all employees, except perhaps principals or even school
board members. It is extremely unlikely that a child will report harassment to such
a person or that the correct information will make its way up the chain of
command. Schools, conscious of potential liability, will develop a "see-no-evil"
attitude to maintain a defense of ignorance, which undermines the purpose of Title
IX. 146
Another problem is the noticeable gap in the Court's standard in its cursory
dismissal of the fact that Lago Vista School District did not promulgate a grievance
procedure. 149 That failure, the Court writes, did not constitute discrimination."'
This reasoning is logically inconsistent because, had a proper grievance procedure
been in place, the "appropriate official" would at least have been identified, and
thus could have been notified. Even though the plaintiff did not notify her
principal, she could not have known the proper procedure or even how the school
should have responded to the initial contact. Moreover, the Department of
Education regulations required district recipients to designate one employee to
handle grievances, to adopt and publish grievance procedures, and to notify
students."' The Office of Civil Rights has argued that in the absence of such a
policy, the school should be liable, even if it is unaware of harassment, because the
144. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
145. Id.
146. id. at2004. One commentatorsuggests, however, that "forward-looking and fiscallyprudent"
schools will continue to implement harassment procedure, as they are still liable under Title VII.
Deborah Volberg, Sexual Harassment Under Title IX: The Same But Different, N.Y.L.J. I (1998).
147. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2004.
148. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., I 18 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866).
149. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
150. Id.
151. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.8 and 106.9 (1998).
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student does not know how to report the harassment. 152 OCR also considers the
existence of grievance procedures when investigating claims.5"
The existence of such procedures should be a necessary and key factor in
determining liability. Without a policy against harassment, the danger is that these
actions will be condoned or ignored."5 Besides avoiding liability by ending
harassment before it has begun or effecting remedial action, a well-stated policy
will fulfill Title IX's ultimate purpose of protecting students. Students will have
an "accessible and fair forum," and they will be aware of their schools' standard
on harassment."' Demonstrating "zero tolerance," the policy should apply to both
students and teachers,' 6 and the school should implement grievance procedures
that encourage reporting'5" and that are widely disseminated."' Such strong
policies may change behavior in school"5 9 and prevent future instances of sexual
harassment.
B. Analysis of the Gebser Rationale
Gebser is the final case in the "trilogy" of cases in which the Supreme Court
has defined the right of action under Title IX. Giving it life in Cannon through an
implied right, then giving it substance in Franklin through monetary damages,"6
the Supreme Court has finally given form to the right: actual notice and deliberate
indifference.'"' However, is this final step a judicial creation or an accurate
interpretation of congressional intent?
1. Text of Title IX
The Court's most basic analysis begins with the text of Title IX."62 Of the
three cases in the trilogy, Gebser most closely examines the text of Title IX, but
only to distinguish it from Title VII.'6 It is ironic that part of the rationale for
152. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,040(1997).
153. Id.
154. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 409 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
155. Ronna Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 Tex.L. Rev. 525, 574
(1987).
156. Emmalena Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment
and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 Comell L. Rev. 1014, 1059 (1998).
157. Henry Newman, Note, The University's Liability for Professor-Student Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX, 66 Fordham L Rev. 2559, 2605 (1998).
158. Brief for National Education Association at 16, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118
S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866).
159. Id. at 19.
160. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979); Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
161. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
162. Id. at 1996.
163. The Cannon court cited only Title IX's focus on a particular class, focusing instead on its
legislative history and similarity to Title VI. 441 U.S. at 677, 99 S. Ct. at 1946. The Franklin court
rejected 1ure statutory construction for an evaluation of the state of the law at Title IX's passage. 503
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Gebser, which represents the furthest step the Supreme Court has taken in its
judicial implications, is a step back to the actual text.'" The Court professes to
have a "measure of latitude to shape" a remedy and confesses to "a degree of
speculation," but then claims to "generally examine" the statute to avoid conflict
with its purpose. 65
The method of the Court's interpretation of Title IX in Gebser is a retreat from
Franklin, a "switching of music," as Justice Scalia might say." In Franklin, the
emphasis was on the settled rule that if rights have been violated and a federal
statute provides a right to sue, courts may award appropriate remedies. 6 In
Gebser, the Court concludes that the rule yielded to the intent of Congress to avoid
frustrating the statute's purposes.t" Although the Court's approach may be
classified as an exercise of the judicial power to interpret legislation, the Court still
appears to be retracting from its previous position. In Franklin, the Court was like
a skilled artisan, handcrafting a remedy from the blueprint Congress provided. In
Gebser, the court seems relegated to an assembly line worker, undeviating from the
explicit demands of Congress.
In order to avoid frustrating Congress' supposed purposes, the Court
concludes there could be no liability based on respondeat superior or constructive
notice.' 69 Title IX has no text that "shed[s] light" on Congress' intent; therefore,
the Court is left to interpreting "clues."' 70 Citing Title IX's means of enforce-
ment,' ' the Court determines that the district should have actual knowledge in
order to end and prevent harassment.'72 It sees a conflict between the enforcement
of the statute requiring notice and voluntary compliance and judicial enforcement
of liability without actual notice.'73 This logic fails, however, because the
U.S. at 71, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
164. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, 1998 WL 146703. During oral
argument, Justice Scalia stated, "[W]e're sort of switching the music if, having created the cause of
action in the face of its nonexpression, despite the fact that this is a spending thing .... we get very
picky... about what the context of that cause of action is." Note that Justice Scalia concurred with the
majority.
165. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996.
166. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, supra note 164.
167. 503 U.S. at 66, 112 S. Ct. at 1033.
168. 118 S. Ct. at 1996.
169. Id. at 1997.
170. Id. 1997-98.
171. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. 1999) provides:
compliance ... may be effected (I) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an
express finding on the record, after opportunity forhearing, of a failure to comply with such
requirement ... or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, that not
such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the
appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has
determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.
(emphasis added).
172. 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
173. Id.
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referenced portion of Title IX refers to the consequences to the education
program's funding, not the right of action an individual has. Those are two distinct
consequences.
The Court argues that unlike Title VII, which specifically defines an employer
to include agent, Title IX contains no reference to agents, and thus an agency
theory is inappropriate.' The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating that the program or
activity in Title IX applies only to those with administrative control.'" However,
Title IX prohibits discrimination under a program or activity, which implies that
some part of the program or activity has resulted in discrimination.'76 Programs
and activities "act" through their individuals; therefore, there need not be any
specific references to agents.1"
Furthermore, Title IX is written in the passive voice from the perspective of
the person who is the object of discrimination, which, Justice Stevens argues, gives
it broader coverage. The focus is on requiring the recipients to provide a
nondiscriminatory environment.'79 Title IX names no actors, uses passive verbs,
and focuses on the setting of discrimination. "o Therefore, the statute only asks,
"whether an individual was subjected to discrimination under a covered program
or activity.''. There is no actor defined in Title IX, so the statute need not
reference agents.' 82
2. Comparisons to Title VII
The Court addresses one "issue squarely": Title IX's relationship to Title
VII.8 3 The effect of Title VII on Title IX has been debated in the Circuits and
commentary. 84 The Supreme Court very carefully distinguishes Title VII, and in
doing so, rejects agency principles.8 5
The most obvious difference between the two statutes is the texts. Title VII
defines "employer" as including any agent of that employer 8 6 whereas Title IX has
174. Id. at 1996; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (Supp. 1999) defines an educational institution as "any
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational,
professional, or higher education."
175. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1997).
176. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. 1999).
177. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866).
178. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2002.
179. Brief for National Women's Law at 19-20, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct.
1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866).
180. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1047 (7th Cir. 1997).
181. Id.
182. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1047 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
183. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (1998).
184. See, e.g, Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995);
Bodnar, supra note 2, at 549.
185. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995-96.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
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no comparable reference. 87 Some commentators have surmised that under Title
VII, culpable parties are the employer and its agents, so courts may use agency
principles. 8 Title IX defines program or activity as the "local educational
agency," the entity with legal control of administering school services. 9
Therefore, the Court argues that the focus of Title IX is on the discriminating effect
of programs within the school district.'" However, there is an alternative analysis
for Title IX not referencing agency. The entire statute is drafted in the passive
voice, and the definition of program is broad, so there is no need to reference any
agent.' 9' Title IX imposes an affirmative duty on recipients to stop discrimination,
which may even provide a broader protection than Title VII, which only refers to
employers. "' Title IX also requires the establishment of a grievance procedure and
a person to handle complaints.'93 Therefore, the focus of the statute is to protect
the individual from a system that discriminates through its agents.
The Court in Gebser distinguishes Title IX as a contract and Title VII as an
"outright prohibition." 94 Title VII seeks to compensate victims, whereas Title IX
seeks to protect them.'" That distinction may be accurate, but does not preclude
the analogy between Title VII and Title IX. Both statutes proscribe sexual
harassment and confront similar issues.'" The employment environment is similar
to the educational one as both have hierarchical power schemes. 97 Despite the fact
that Title IX addresses a problem before it has begun and Title VII addresses the
consequences of the problem, both try to resolve the same fundamental issue:
sexual harassment. To be sure, schools and workplaces do not have identical
environments; 98 however, these differences enhance, rather than reduce, the need
for a more lenient standard of liability. Students are transient and less likely to
seek remedial action than employees are.'" Their benefits include intellectual
growth, which is less objectively measurable than are employee benefits.2"
Finally, a court is likely to show more deference to schools."' These distinctions
187. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996.
188. Brief for National School Boards Association at 15, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866).
189. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1990); 20 U.S.C. § 8801 (1990).
190. Brief of National School Boards Association at 16, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866).
191. Brady, supra note 88, at 436.
192. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17,Gebserv. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998)
(No. 96-1866).
193. Schneider, supra note 155, at 545 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a-b) (1986)).
194. Gebser v. Lago Indep. Sch. Dist., 18 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (1998).
195. Id.
196. Quesada, supra note 156, at 1047.
197. Newman, supra note 157, at 2578.
198. However, one commentator found the hostile environment in education different from one





only indicate a need for greater protection of students, as students are in a more
vulnerable position.
Title VII may be distinguished from Title IX because it contains limits on
liability."2 For example, the Fifth Circuit decided that employers have detailed
regulations, which "state forthrightly" an employer's responsibility for sexual
harassment. 0 3 In contrast, Title IX does not regulate Claims, nor does it even
mention sexual harassment. 2 This reasoning, however, represents a cursory look
at Title IX and its jurisprudence. Instead of setting out regulations for claims, Title
IX requires recipients to do so.205 Sexual harassment has been regarded as
discrimination since Meritor so it need not be specifically mentioned in the statute.
Despite the Court's narrowly drawn distinctions, it nevertheless uses Title VII
to support an argument about Title IX. Once monetary damages were available
under Title VII, Congress limited recovery."° Accepting the principles of agency
would allow unlimited recovery under Title IX "in the face of evidence that when
Congress expressly considered... Title VII[,] it restricted the amount of damages
available."2 7 This argument seems to undermine the Court's aim of rejecting Title
VII-Title IX comparisons. On the one hand, the Court asserts the statutes are very
different, and yet, on the other, it uses Title VII damages to draw conclusions about
Title IX.
The Court has perhaps made an unnecessary argument. Even courts that refuse
to apply agency standards, nevertheless, acknowledge that it is useful to look to
Title VII as precedents to establish the requirements of a hostile environment
because Title VII and its jurisprudence provide the basis for sexual harassment
claims.2"' An analysis of hostile environment, the less clear cut of the two
harassment claims under Title VII, is useful for the claim under Title IX.209 The
same definitions of sexual harassment are used for both as well as the same
requirements for a claim. Presumably, courts will not completely abandon their
reliance on Title VII principles; however, the danger remains that the present Title
IX jurisprudence will be inadequate to guide future decisions.' Was this
distinction even necessary? Some courts have arrived at agency theories for Title
IX somewhat independently of Title VII.2' The Court could have rejected agency
solely on the text of Title IX and policy concerns. 2'
202. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir.. 1997).
203. Id. One wonders why if the regulations were so forthright, the Supreme Court felt the need
this past term to twice address employer liability for sexual harassment.
204. Id.
205. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1999).
206. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (1998).
207. Id.
208. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014,1023 (7th Cir. 1997).
209. Bodnar, supra note 2, at 565.
210. Schneider, supra note 155, at 543 (describing the "paucity" of Title IX decisions).
211. See, e.g., Doe v. Claibome County Tennessee, 103 F.3d 495,514(6th Cir. 1996) (citing OCR
and the text of Title IX).
212. Perhaps, the Court was internally distinguishing the seemingly similar fact scenarios but
different conclusions in Faragher and Burlington.
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3. Comparisons to Title VI
Having rejected Title VII comparisons, the Court instead determines that a
comparison of Title IX to Title VI was more appropriate."' Title IX was modeled
after Title VI in wording, and both operate as Spending Clause legislation." 4 The
two statutes are worded nearly identically, except Title IX substitutes "sex" for
"race, color, or national origin" and adds "education" to program."' The
comparison between Title IX and Title VI is compelling and accords with many
lower circuit opinions that adopted the actual knowledge principle.2 6
Liability under Title VI rests on intentional violations.' 7 For unintentional
violations, a plaintiff is entitled only to an injunction and other noncompensatory
relief.2"' As Title IX was interpreted in Gebser, Title VI is interpreted as a contract
whereby the recipients are offered an option of money with conditions attached, but
they are free to decline. 19 In order to prevail on a Title VI claim, a plaintiff must
show a discriminatory intent and effect.2
Apparently the Court assumes Title VI standards can fill the voids in Title IX
legislation; however, there are still difficulties. Using Title VI standards, the Fifth
Circuit noted that a sexual harassment claim would fail absent direct involvement
by a school district. 22' One commentator explained that even notice would not
impute liability.2 There is also great difficulty in proving discriminatory intent.
223
For example, in Guardians v. New York,224 the Supreme Court found that the
plaintiffs failed to prove a discriminatory intent for an entrance exam on which
white officers continually received higher scores and, as a result, got more
promotions. The factors of proving discriminatory intent include the impact of an
action bearing more heavily on one race, the historical background of the decision,
the sequence of events leading to the decision, and departures from normal
procedures.2 Moreover, Title VI addresses entirely unique problems and is not
a suitable analogy for Title IX.2"6
213. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (1998).
214. Id.
215. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1990) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1984).
216. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Doe
v. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Ca. 1993).
217. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983).
.218. Id. at 607, 103 S. Ct. at 3235.
219. Id. at 599, 103 S. Ct. at 3231.
220. Newman, supra note 157, at 2573.
221. Canutillo lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1996).
222. Newman, supra note 157, at 2573.
223. Id.
224. 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
225. Client's Council v. Pierce, 532 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
226. Specifically, Title VI addresses problems of racial discrimination.
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4. Overruling Franklin?
In Franklin, the Supreme Court held that a damages remedy was available
under Title IX, relying on an early theory of the'court's power to award appropriate
relief for a violated right. 2" Simply put, the theory concluded that an individual is
entitled to an adequate remedy for a wrong.228 Historically, the Court has implied
private causes of action from statutes that do not expressly provide for such
causes. 9 Later, the Court recognized a presumption that all appropriate remedies
are available in an implied cause.2 13 However, it has also limited the presumption
by requiring legislative intent for that remedy or using intent to show the
nonexistence of a remedy.23' Yet, one commentator suggested that courts should
not limit themselves to analysis of legislative intent because Congress can always
amend the statute if it disagrees with an interpretation.232 Determining intent is
difficult because "Congress quite often enacts legislation without considering such
questions as whether private individuals have a cause of action.""
With Franklin, academics cheered the return of the presumption of
remedies. 234 The Franklin Court wrote, "Congress did not intend to limit the
remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX"' That statement was
interpreted to mean only clear congressional intent can limit remedies.3 Justice
Scalia, in a separate concurrence, critiqued the Court's reasoning, and explained
that unless Congress expressly restricts a right, one it does not know it is creating,
it intends the full range of remedies.3 ' He warned that judicial limitations should
apply in judicially implied rights."
Although the language in Franklin is particularly broad in awarding remedies,
the Court in Gebser retracts from that theory, imposing Justice Scalia's judicial
limitations. The Court finds legislative intent to provide for an actual knowledge
standard; however, legislative intent as to a judicially implied right could compel
a different result. In determining intent, the context of the law when it was passed
227. 503 U.S. 60, 66, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1033 (1992).
228. Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent In Determining the Existence of Implied
Rights of Action, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 861, 864 (1996).
229. Kelly S. Terry, Note, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: Reviving the Presumption
of Remedies Under Implied Rights ofAction, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 715, 717 (1993).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Stabile, supra note 228, at 901.
233. Id.
234. One commentator wrote, "Thus, Franklin restored and strengthened the presumption of
appropriate remedies." Terry, supra note 229, at 726. Another wrote, "The Court's decision in
Franklin makes clear that the right-remedy principle first announced in Marbury v. Madison remains
in full vitality." Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante,
33 Wake Forrest L. Rev. 261, 289 (1998).
235. 503 S. Ct. 60, 72, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1992).
236. Amber Myrick, Implied Monetary Damages for Gender Discrimination Under Title IX:
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 28 Gonz. L. Rev. 317, 336 (1993).




is important.2 3 9 With the passage of Title IX, both Titles VI and VII were in place;
however, the development of sexual harassment law was still fourteen years away
in Meritor.4 Therefore, the more important context of Title IX is the context of
Title VII and its applicable sexual harassment principles. Legislative history
usually provides some insight into intent; however, Title IX's legislative history
could arguably be read to invoke either Title VI or Title VII. 4
5. Spending Power
The crux of the Supreme Court's argument in Gebser is that Title IX was
enacted under the Spending Clause 2 and therefore requires that the recipient
should have clear notice of potential liability that it may incur when it chooses to
accept the funds. '3 The Court finds it unlikely that state education recipients of
federal funds knowingly agreed to be liable whenever an employee was guilty of
discrimination.2" Therefore, liability is imposed when there is actual knowledge
of harassment. This argument certainly is not novel; Title IX has traditionally been
interpreted as Spending Clause legislation245 because it is conditional federalfunding. 46
In South Dakota v. Dole,"7 the Supreme Court described the spending power
as the power to condition funds upon the recipient's agreement to follow federal
directives and policies. The power, though broad, is subject to the following
limitations: exercise must be in pursuit of the general welfare, conditions must be
unambiguous to allow states to make a knowing decision, and grants must be
related to the federal interest." s If states view federal polices as contrary to local
ones, they may decline to accept the grants. 24' The understanding is that the
Spending Clause forms a contract whereby states accept funds and agree to comply
with conditions. 5 Conditions must be unambiguous"* so states can knowingly
accept the terms of the contract. 52 There are no conditions in the statute implying
239. Stabile, supra note 228, at 888.
240. 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
241. Stabile, supra note 228, at 893.
242. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
243. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1998 (1998).
244. Id.
245. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 185, 1185 (7th Cir. 1981); Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist:, 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., Perry
Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 1997); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786,702 (11 th Cir.), rev'd
in part (on other grounds), 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998).
246. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1999).
247. 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2795 (1987).
248. Id. at 207, 107 S. Ct. at 2796.
249. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168, 112 S. Ct. 2408,2424 (1992).
250. Brief for Respondent, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No.
96-1866) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 17,71, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981)).
251. Brief for Respondent at 23, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
252. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
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strict liability, so no state could have made a "knowing" choice without being
informed of the consequences of strict liability.253
However, this interpretation assumes states live in ignorance of the law. As
Justice Stevens points out, schools did have notice that damages were available for
intentional discrimination by teachers because of Franklin." At the very least, the
decision that sexual harassment is a prohibited form of discrimination is clear.
2 15
Even in Pennhurst, the Supreme Court decision often cited for its contract theory
of the Spending Clause, the Court stated there "is no knowing acceptance if a State
is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it."2"
Schools had more than adequate notice of potential liability. 27 A private cause for
monetary relief had been awarded, agency theory had been well litigated regarding
sexual harassment, and OCR promulgated standards for liability. The language of
Franklin was more than adequate notice:
This notice problem does not arise in a case such as this, in which
intentional discrimination is alleged. Unquestionably Title IX placed on
the Gwinnett... [s]chools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of
sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminates' on the basis of
sex." We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually
harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal
moneys to be expendedto support the intentional actions it sought by
statute to proscribe."'
The Spending Clause argument hinges on the issue of "intentional" discrimina-
tion. The majority defines intentional from the viewpoint of the district."9 When
a teacher harasses a student, unbeknownst to any school official, the discrimination
is unintentional from the district's perspective." It follows that the district cannot
possibly know that it is violating a condition, so it cannot be held liable in order to
preserve the contractual nature of Title IX.26' Franklin has been interpreted in the
same way. One commentator wrote that Franklin only addressed intentional
discrimination (i.e., actual knowledge of the district) and that the intent requirement
gave districts notice of their liability.2"2 Both Gebser and Franklin have subtly
253. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 1996).
254. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct 1989, 2004 (1998).
255. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992).
256. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).
257. The majority relies on 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998) which mentions notice to an official before
the termination of funds. That argument confuses the purpose of 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (1998) with the
judicially implied cause of action.
258. 503 U.S. at 75, 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
259. Gebser, I 18 S. Ct. at 1998.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Susan L. Wright, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: The Supreme Court implies
a Damages Remedy for Title IX Sexual Discrimination, 45 Vand. L Rev. 1367, 1384 (1992).
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shifted the meaning of notice from the federal/state contract to actual violations.
Under the Spending Clause, the only requirement is that conditions be unambigu-
ous, not that states easily be on notice of violations. The federal government
unambiguously informed states that they could be liable for sexual harassment in
any form. It is the states' responsibility to monitor for such violations.
Justice Stevens recognizes that the state had fair notice and defined intentional
from the perspective of the student.263 As Meritor stated, sexual harassment is
discrimination on the basis of sex, i.e., "intentional discrimination." 2" The intent,
therefore, is in the teacher's actions.265 This argument comports with the wording
of the statute, which is written from the perspective of the student.266 The student
is entitled to be free from discrimination under any program; certainly teachers are
classified as part of the program. Furthermore, in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products,26 the Supreme Court concluded that a hostile work environment based
on co-worker harassment constituted intentional discrimination under Title VII
with no reference to whether the employer was aware or not. By analogy, hostile
environment sexual harassment in an educational setting should also be classified
as intentional discrimination.
V. A BETTER SOLUTION
A more appropriate theory of liability is an agency standard with an affirmative
defense of an effective grievance policy.268 The district should be liable for a
teacher's harassment because in fact the teacher is always aided in the harassment
by the existence of the agency relationship. "69 The teacher in Gebser used his
authority over the plaintiff to engage in discriminatory behavior.270 As one amicus
brief explained, "[D]elegated authority cannot be defined so narrowly that the
employing entity is insulated from responsibility whenever its employees fail to live
up to the entity's rules of conduct."27'
263. Gebser, I 18 S. Ct. at 2002.
264. Meritor v. Vinson Savings Bank, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986).
265. Brady, supra note 88, at 436.
266. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1999).
267. 511 U.S. 244, 114S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
268. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Constructive knowledge is an
appealing standard; however, it is potentially problem ridden.. For example, would the same standard
make a school district liable for peer sexual harassment? Also, many victims of harassment which
occur in private would remain uncompensated and not vindicated under the auspices of the reasonable
person test. Even in Gebser, the plaintiff may have no recovery under a constructive knowledge
standard because the harassment occurred in private. Because of the dynamics of the relationship of
a school employee sexually harassing a student, the authority of the harasser is key. Therefore, an
agency standard is more appropriate.
269. Gebser, I 18 S. Ct. at 2003.
270. Id. at 2004. The two often had sexual intercourse during school time. Waldrop also was the
only teacher of advanced classes, in which the plaintiff had an interest.
271. Brief for National Education Association at 9, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118
S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866). The respondent suggested agency principles should be modified to
include a third party's reasonable belief that the principal authorizes the agent. Students who are
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This standard does not impose strict liability, but absence of notice is not a
shield for the employer. 72 Using solely agency principles would essentially result
in a form of strict liability because conceivably every school employee is vested
with some authority, or a child may believe so. "For example, a security employee
may reasonably be perceived by very young students as acting with the authority
of the educational institution although the actual delegation of authority to him may
be very limited." '  Incorporating an affirmative defense into the standard of
liability removes the possibility of strict liability. Justice Ginsburg explains the
nature of the defense:
The burden would be the school district's to show that its internal
remedies were adequately publicized and likely would have provided
redress without exposing the complainant to undue risk, effort, or
expense. Under such a regime, to the extent that a plaintiff unreasonably
failed to avail herself of the school district's preventive and remedial
measures, and consequently suffered avoidable harm, she would not
qualify for Title IX relief
2 4
This theory would align Title IX liability with Title VII, both of which address
sexual harassment. Within a Title IX cause of action is a basic sexual harassment
claim, the elements of which have been fully developed under Title VII. Courts
even unknowingly draw upon Title VII case law to analyze quid pro quo and
hostile environment. Although the statutes have dissimilar wording and have been
classified under different constitutional powers, both have identical aims of
prohibiting sexual discrimination. Title VII and Title IX now have similar
remedies, injunctions and compensatory relief.2"' Furthermore, analogies between
Title VII and Title IX have been valid in other contexts besides sexual harassment.
In EI-Marazku v. University of Wisconsin," the plaintiff filed a Title IX suit,
alleging discrimination based on her gender when she was denied advancement and
continued employment. The court declared it was "reasonable to apply Title VII
caselaw" to the Title IX claim. 77 In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,"'8 the
Supreme Court, analyzing a Title IX claim, focused on maternity leave, and
emphasized the differences of Title VI and the similarities of Title VII. In Ivan v.
harassed do reasonably believe in the authority of the teacher and therefore become vulnerable to a
misuse of power. Blame should not be shifted to the students and their misconceptions.
272. Id. at 12.
273. Brief for the United States at 15, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., I 18 S. Ct. 1989
(1998) (No. 96-1866).
274. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2007.
275. Elizabeth J. Gant, Applying Title VII "HWE" Analysis to Title IX of the Education
Amendment of 1972-An Avenue of Relieffor Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in
Schools, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 489 (1994).
276. 134 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 1998).
277. Id.
278. 456 U.S. 512, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
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Kent State University,279 the Sixth Circuit considered Title IX and Title VII claims
on identical facts.' 0
Not adopting an agency standard leads to absurd conclusions. In an
employment context, a school district would be liable for sexual harassment by its
employees even in the absence of actual knowledge by its supervisors.2 ' In both
Burlington... and Faragher,283 the Supreme Court held that an employer is
vicariously liable for a hostile work environment posed by a supervisor with
authority over an employee, subject to an affmnative defense that the employer
exercises reasonable care and the employee failed to take advantage of opportuni-
ties.' " If an employee and student were both harassed unbeknownst to the
employers and school districts, the employee would have a claim but the student
would not under the Gebser rationale.
This result is logically inconsistent considering the similarities between
education and employment settings. In both contexts, the victim is required to
attend, complete jobs, meet deadlines, and respond to authority. The social
atmospheres are similar because both include the same groups of people.8 5 In both
school and employment settings, the victims are unable to stop the abuse, "leaving
them unnerved and potentially inhibited in their growth." ' Sexual harassment in
a school environment arguably may be even more damaging. Children and
teenagers often have not developed "firm self concepts," so abuse can cause even
greater harm.28r 7 Also, children cannot simply switch schools or enter a private
school if finances are limited.2 88 A nondiscriminatory environment is essential for
intellectual growth. 9
An agency theory would support other particulars of Title IX. OCR declared
that agency principles should be used.' OCR is the agency responsible for
enforcing Title IX,29 ' and under the Chevron doctrine, it should be entitled to
deference. Under Chevron, if Congress has spoken directly on the issue, Congress'
intent prevails.292 There is no such clear intent, so Chevron's second test is whether
the agency's interpretation is reasonable.293 An agency standard of liability is quite
279. 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996).
280. Id.
281.: Brief for National Education Association at 11, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118
S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866).
282. 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
283. 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
284. See 524 U.S. 742,118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); 524 U.S. 775,118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
285. Melissa Nasrah, Casenote: A Lost Chance in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District
to Use Title IXto Make Schools Stop Peer Sexual Harassment By imposing Title VII Standards, 5 Am.
U.J. Gender, Soc. Pol'y & L. 453 (1997).
286. Clark, supra note 39, at 373.
287. Id. at 374.
288. Bredthauer, supra note 85, at 1147.
289. Clark, supra note 39, at 374.
290. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,039 (1997).
291. Brady, supra note 88, at 414.
292. 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984).
293. Id. at 844, 104 S. Ct. at 2782.
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reasonable considering the type of claim and Congress' intent to prohibit sexual
discrimination. Yet, the Supreme Court does not even mention OCR, let alone give
it deference. That noticeable absence is in contradiction to other cases where
courts have given deference to OCR.294 Only Justice Stevens' dissent recognizes
that OCR, under the Department of Education, has a special interest in Title IX,
and its decision is significant.295 Furthermore, an agency theory is consistent with
the text of Title IX; agents' actions can be classified as part of a program under
which a student faces discrimination.
Damages do not necessarily have to be extreme under an agency theory. The
majority argues that educational funds should not be diverted from useful programs
and that recovery may exceed the level of funding.' Certainly, high verdicts
would harm children; however, courts may control awards.29 The majority even
cites the fact that Title VII damages have been limited.2" Why could the same not
be done for Title IX? One commentator suggests damages could be limited to
rehabilitation costs, which would not significantly impair a school district.2' A
school district is in the best position to bear this risk. It may institute strict policies
and grievance procedures, which would discourage harassment while ensuring a
defense to liability, and it may more carefully monitor the hiring of teachers and
observe teacher/student relationships.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment in a school environment is a danger that threatens the goals
of Title IX.3  As one court wrote, "[A] schoolchild's right to personal security and
to bodily integrity manifestly embraces the right to be free from sexual abuse at the
hands of a public school employee."' '3 Unfortunately, the Gebser decision does
not provide adequate protection for students. Not only is it based on illogical
reasoning, but the actual knowledge standard also discourages school districts from
instigating grievance procedures in order to shield themselves from liability. A
vicious cycle may begin in which a school district does not promulgate procedures,
leaving the student with no knowledge of the proper means of recourse.
Accordingly, the student never reports the sexual harassment to a proper official.
294. See Bryant v. Colgate Univ., 996 F. Supp. 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (OCR regulations were
reasonable and given controlling weight); Schnettlerv. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 1994
WL 142958 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (OCR interpretations affirmed); Favia v. Indiana Univ., 812 F. Supp. 578
(W.D. Pa. 1993) (OCR given deference).
295. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2004. The respondent argues, however, that the OCR fails to take into
account the text of Title IX. Brief for Respondent at 32, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118
S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866).
296. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
297. Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1997.
299. Richard A. Fossey et al., Title IV Liability for School Districts When Employees Sexually
Assault Children: A Law and Policy Analysis, 124 Ed. Law Rep. 485,491 (1998).
300. Quesada, supra note 156, at 1065.
301. Doe v. Claiborne County Tennessee, 103 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Without a proper official ever having actual knowledge, the student becomes a
victim again and has no claim for recovery from the very institution that is
responsible for his or her injury.
The impact of Gebser will be tremendous. Plaintiffs must now prove what the
school knew and who in the school knew it. 2 These cases are much more difficult
to prove, but not impossible if students give actual notice to an appropriate
person." ' However, knowing the appropriate person assumes the school has
notified its students of who that person is and adopted an efficient grievance
procedure. In the final paragraph of Gebser, the Court offhandedly mentions
Section 1983 actions as a student's remedy,"° but one wonders how effective those
actions would really be."0 The Court does conclude that it will use an actual notice
standard until Congress speaks on the matter. Hopefully, Congress will resolve the
problems of the Gebser decision by adopting the proposed agency theory.
Kelly Titus
302. Volberg, supra note 146.
303. Id.
304. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989,2000 (1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. 1983
(1999)).
305. In Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds,
171 F.3d 607 (1999), the Eighth Circuit addressed a 1983 action in a sexual harassment claim. The
elements of proof are 1) district had notice of pattern of unconstitutional acts; 2) deliberate indifference
or tacit authorization; 3) failure to take adequate remedial action; and 4) proximate cause of injury.
Certainly, these elements represent an even stronger burden of proof.
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